Behaviourism

In the debate about reality in metaphysics of the mind, you are supposed to decide whether you think all mental states can be explained via physical processes, or whether there are phenomenal aspects to our mental states.

Behaviourism is a type of physicalism. There are no phenomenal aspects to our mental states. Instead:

'Hard' behaviourism: all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements

'Soft' behaviourism: propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions

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What does Behaviourism say about Mental States?

Behaviourism says the meaning of words used to describe mental states, such as ‘pain’, ‘sad’, ‘happy’, ‘think’ etc. is all about what is externally observable, your behaviour.
So, for a behaviourist, the meaning of ‘pain’ is seen by your actions, whether that is to wince, say “ouch!”, try to get away from the source of the pain, have an elevated heart rate, and so on.
Qualia are irrelevant to what ‘pain’ means. Behaviourism is only about the external and observable manifestations.

Hard Behaviourism

Carl Hempel is a hard behaviourist.
All propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions about behaviours and bodily states using the language of physics.
You can give a complete account of the mind purely in terms of actual behaviours.
If you completely describe a person’s physical state and associated behaviours, you have described their mind and there is absolutely nothing left over.
You can get a clear, complete and 100% accurate account of someone's mental state by observing how they act.
Hard behaviourism says mental states analytically reduce to behaviours.

Problem for Hard Behaviourism

You can have a mental state but not have the associated behaviour.
Or, you can have a behaviour, but not the associated mental state.
For example, you can be in pain but stop yourself from saying “ouch!”. Maybe because you don't want to look weak?
You can pretend to be in pain (i.e. display the behaviour) when you’re not actually feeling anything, like when a player dives in football.
How this is a problem for Hard Behaviourism (integration): You cannot completely describe a person’s physical state and behaviours with nothing left over.

Soft Behaviourism

Gilbert Ryle is a Soft Behaviourist.
Propositions about mental states are propositions about behavioural dispositions.
A disposition is how something will or is likely to behave in certain circumstances. For example, a wine glass has a disposition to break when dropped on a hard surface. The wine glass has this disposition even when it hasn’t been dropped and is in perfect condition.
Similarly, someone in the mental state of pain will have a disposition to say “ouch!” – even if they don’t actually do so in every instance.
Simply put, a behavioural disposition is a tendency or capacity to behave in certain ways under certain conditions.
It’s not an actual behaviour but a pattern of how someone would behave if the relevant circumstances arose.

Soft Behaviourism as an Anti-Dualist Theory

Ryle’s arguments for behaviourism also come up as criticisms of dualism, specifically Substance Dualism.
Ryle argues that if dualism were true, mental concepts would be impossible to use. If mental states ARE private and non-physical, how could we ever talk about them?
I can’t literally show you what is going on in my mind when I am in pain. You can’t point to a mental state such as pain, you can only point to the behaviour.
Ryle argues that calling mental states a someTHING else other than behavioural dispositions is making a category mistake. Mental states are not things.
It's like asking about the smell of the colour yellow. You've misplaced "yellow" into the wrong category of "smells".
If an alien were to ask what the mental state of pain is. You show the alien people stubbing their toes, wincing, saying “ouch!”, and so on. We explain mental states by describing behaviours.
Ryle is arguing that the mental state of pain is nothing more than the various behavioural dispositions associated with pain.

Problem: Asymmetry between self and other knowledge

When I stub my toe, I have direct access to the sensation of pain it produces. I immediately know what I am feeling.
But when I see someone else in pain, my access is indirect: I don’t literally feel their pain, and I can easily be mistaken about what they are experiencing.
So, while my own mental states are known with certainty, other people’s mental states are only known uncertainly through observing their behaviour. Essentially, we have to guess what they are going through. But we never have to guess what we are going through. This shows a clear asymmetry between first-person knowledge and third-person observation.
Simply put, behaviousists say that I should know my own pain equally as well as someone else's. This is clearly not the case, we know our own pain a lot better than others.
This is a problem for behaviourism because (integration): There must be another way to meaningfully know about a mind than through behaviour.

Problem: Super Spartans

This is an argument by Hilary Putnam. Super Spartans are an imagined community of people who completely suppress any outward demonstration of pain.
They have no dispositions toward pain behaviour. If a super spartan were stabbed, for example, the have no associated behaviour. No wincing, no "ouch", no elevation of their heart rate.
Super Spartans might feel pain internally, but they might not show it externally. This means that they would still experience a subjective experience of pain.
This is a problem for behaviourism because a Super Spartan will NEVER show any associated behaviour for a mental state. This means (integration) you can have a mental state without the associated behaviour and thus mental states cannot be reduced to behavioural dispositions

Problem: Multiple Realisability

The same mental state can be realised through multiple different behaviours depending on a person’s other mental state.
Simply put, the same mental state can lead to 100s of different behaviours because we are always going through multiple mental states. We are complex creatures. We are not as simple as one mental state in, one behaviour out. At any given time, we can be feeling tired, hungry, sad, motivated, lazy but also have desires and beliefs. These can happen all at once.
These other mental states also need to be analysed in terms of behaviours, which again might vary depending on a person’s other mental states. This can go on forever.
it seems impossible for behaviourism to explain mental states as behaviours without assuming various other mental states.
For example, this morning I had the mental state of desire to go on a run. The correct associated behaviour would be to fulfil that desire by getting up and going out on a run. However, I also had the mental state of tiredness and so I did not go on a run. A behaviourist would say I never had that desire to go on a run because I did not exhibit the associated behaviour. But I did, I was just tired >:(

Problem: Circularity

Behaviourism must assume other mental states in order to give an analysis of mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions.
If you try to define those other mental states in terms of behavioural dispositions, you will end up back where it started.
We almost have to ask what is the point if the same mental state can be realised by two completely opposite behaviours.
For example:

Scenario 1: I have the behavioural disposition to say "ouch!" when I am in pain and therefore pain = saying ouch.

Scenario 2: I have the behavioural disposition to stay quiet when I am in pain because I don't want to appear weak and therefore pain = not saying ouch.
In these two scenarios, pain is realised by two completely conflicting behaviours.
The behaviourist claim that mental terms can be reduced to behavioural terms seems false because reduction is a one-to-one relation. One thing can’t be multiply reducible to different things.